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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:
As we write only for the parties involved, we do not restate the facts of the
case. Due to an opinion issued by the Pennsylvania Superior Court after the District
Court resolved this case, we reverse and remand with an order for the District Court to
enter judgment in favor of SCM.
Since the District Court rendered its opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has issued an opinion in which it holds that the “knockout rule” applies to contracts
governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. See Flender Corp. v. Tippins Intern., Inc.,

830 A.2d 1279 (Pa.Super. 2003). We believe that Flender correctly states Pennsylvania
law on this matter and predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the
“knockout rule” in this case. See, also, Reilly Foam Corp. v. Rubbermaid Corp., 206
F.Supp.2d 643 (E.D.Pa.2002); Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th
Cir.1984). As such, we hold that neither the original terms nor the handwritten changes,
which were obviously “different” and not simply “additional” terms, control the issue of
acceptance. Instead, we look to the U.C.C. to supply the default terms of acceptance.
Under the UCC, “[a]cceptance of goods occurs when the buyer:... (2) fails
to make an effective rejection (section 2602(a)), but such acceptance does not occur until
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them...” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2606.1 The
Code goes on to explain that, under § 2606, to avoid a default acceptance of the goods,
the buyer must make a “[r]ejection of goods ... within a reasonable time after their
delivery.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2602.
Under Pennsylvania law, a reasonable time for inspection after tender or
delivery for rejection or revocation of defective goods “is generally deemed a question of
fact to be resolved by the fact finder, and no express outside time limit is set.” Ford

1

“Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted and
if made with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be revoked because of it unless the
acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be
seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by
this division for nonconformity.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2607. It is very difficult for CDM to
argue that it has not rejected the Router because it expects SCM, who cannot fix the
problem, to seasonally fix the problem 3 years after the installation and 2 years after the
instigation of this lawsuit.

Motor Credit Co. v. Caiazzo, 564 A.2d 931, 936 (Pa.Super.,1989)(citation omitted).
Nevertheless, we find here that, as a matter of law, CDM has accepted the goods.
First, CDM clearly had more than a reasonable opportunity to inspect and
reject the goods. The Router was delivered in December 2000. By the time of the
judgment in this case, CDM had had more than a reasonable amount of time for CDM to
determine if the Router was satisfactory. This is especially true since the problem with
the Router was not inherent to the Router itself, but rather due to CDM’s contractual
problems with another company. To top it all off, CDM’s own president stated that his
company had spent too much time and money to give the project up. See App. 424.
Second, CDM never made an effective rejection of the Router.2 Thus, as a
matter of law, it has accepted the Router and must pay the contractual price for it plus any
damages that resulted from its breach of the contract.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the March 25, 2003 order and
REMAND to the District Court to enter judgment in favor of SCM and determine
damages.

2

CDM ’s alleged “rejection” letter is nothing of the sort. App. 581-582. The letter
merely conditionalizes a future rejection of the goods upon further testing. Nowhere in
the appellate record has CDM made a true rejection of the goods.

